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1. Introduction
The history of security interests in movables on the European continent
begins with the 'reception' of Roman law in the guise of Justinian's
Corpus luris Civilis in the Middle Ages.1 As with any code, Justinian's cod-
ification forms the conclusion of an era in the development of the law.
Legal concepts not incorporated into the code, like the ancient fiducia
cum creditore, were consequently concealed from the legal consciousness
for ages, until some of them were drawn from the collective subcon-
scious of the civil law in the course of the nineteenth Century. An assess-
ment of the Roman origins of the Continental European system of secu-
rity interests in movables is important, particularly since many aspects
of the modern system have been consciously developed as a reaction to
the Roman system. The current statutory pfovisions on the creation of
a valid pledge, for example, are only comprehensible if it is appreciated
that they were formulated as a response to the deviating provisions of
Roman law. It will, therefore, be necessary to glimpse briefly the Roman
system of security interests in movables as contained in Justinian's
codification.
1
 On the reception of Roman law see especially Francesco Calasso. Medio Aevo del
Diritto (1954), passim; Fr. Calasso. Introduzione al Diritto Commune (1970), passim; Helmut
Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht I (Älteres Gemeines Recht) (1985) ff.; John Dawson, The
Oracles of the law (1968) 125 ff., 177 ff. and 263 ff.; Paul Koschaker, Europa und das
römische Recht (1966), passim; and Fr. Wieacker, Privalrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1967),
passim.
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2. Justinian Roman law
After the demise of the concept offiduda,2 Roman law recognised only
two proprietary security interests, pignus and hypotheca. Both interests
differed from fiducia in the sense that with pignus and hypotheca the
absolute legal title to the object of these security interests remained
with the chargor (pledge-debtor), whereas fiducia implied a transfer of
title by the chargor to the chargee (pledge-creditor).3 The two remain-
ing proprietary security interests of Roman law were iura in re aliena,
special proprietary interests in goods belonging to another, mostly (but
not necessarily) the debtor. This fundamental fact has some important
consequences, dominating the law on this subject to date. One is that
the chargor remains entitled to dispose of his property as hè sees fit,
even though a security interest has been vested in it. He may charge his
property again to secure another debt. Furthermore, hè may even trans-
fer his title to another person without the permission of the chargee.
Any contract to the contrary only has effect as between chargor and
chargee4 and does not affect the rights of third parties, such as super-
vening chargees and new owners. The original chargee, however, has
a security interest, which ranks higher than any security interest sub-
sequently established and which vests in him the right to recover the
object of his security interests from any new owner. It would, therefore,
be quite wrong to construe the creation of a security interest as a means
to separate the objects of security interests from the rest of the assets
of the chargor. In spite of the creation of a security interest, they still
constitute a part of the assets of the chargor, and are even subject to the
rights of his other, non-secured creditors. All the chargee has is a right
to satisfy his debt out of the sale of the objects of his security interest
2
 On fiducia see M. Käser, Dos romische Pnvatrecht (RP) I (1971) 144 f. and 460 ff.; RP II
(1975) 275 and 313; and especially G. Noordraven, De 'Fiducia' In hel Romeinse recht
(1988).
3
 Unless otherwise indicated, I will use the term 'charge' throughout in the broad sense,
as a 'real' bürden attaching to a certain part of the debtor's property as a security
interest for the payment of a debt. The words 'chargor' and 'chargee' stand for the
grantor and the grantee of a proprietary security interest.
4
 There is one passage in Justinian's Digests (D. 20,5,7,2 (Marcianus)) containing a
reference to a contract between chargor and chargee, restricting the chargor's powers
of disposition. The passage has been the subject of controversy, as it seems superfluous
in view of the fact that the chargee may successfully sue anyone m possession,
includmg a new owner, for recovery. See e.g. Schlichtmg, Die Verfugungsbeschranlcung des
Verpfänden im klassischen romischen Recht (1973); Wacke, Rivista Internazionale di Diritto
Romono e Antico 24 (1973) 184 ff.; and Käser, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 44 (1976)
283 ff.
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with preference over other creditors. That right, however, is a right in
rem. In order to enforce it, the chargee has an action for recovery of the
objects of his security interest against anyone in possession, the actio
Serviana. It should be stressed, however, that the nature of that action
differs from that of the rei vindicatio, the proprietary Roman action of
the owner for specific restitution of his property. The object of the actio
Serviana is recovery of the objects of security interests by way of distress,
whereas the rei vindicatio presupposes an immediate right to possession,
irrespective of any particular purpose other than restitution of posses-
sion.
Hence there are frequent conflicts of interests between secured credi-
tors on the one hand and the 'trustee in bankruptcy', the curator bonorum,
on the other in many civil law Systems. In Roman law, there was no spe-
cific duty of sale on the part of a secured creditor, as there is in modern
civil law jurisdictions, but the chargee could be forced to surrender the
objects of his security interest to the chargor whenever the latter wanted
to dispose of his property.5 One may, therefore, assume that the curator
bonorum was able to block an action for recovery by the chargee when-
ever the latter was not willing to seil. The explanation is, of course, that
the equity in the property granted as security that is the surplus value
thereof remained with the chargor.
The legal dichotomy between movables and immovables is fundamen-
tal to many, if not all, modern Continental European legal Systems, espe-
cially in so far as security interests are concerned. This was not the
case in Roman law. There was no rule restricting non-possessory security
interests to real (immovable) property and possessory security interests
to (movable) goods. On the contrary: pledge (pignus), a possessory secu-
rity interest, could be vested in personal as well as real property, whereas
'hypothec' (hypotheca), the non-possessory security interest of Roman law,
could also be vested in real, as well as personal, property. It was only as
a matter of convenience that pledge (pignus) was associated with goods
(movables), because they are more suitable for delivery than real prop-
erty (land).6 The two security interests of Roman law, accordingly, merely
differed in so far as their respective modes of creation were concerned,
a pledge being created by delivery of possession (traditio) and a nypotheca
by way of a simple contract:
5
 D. 13,7,6 pr. (Pomponius) and see on this passage Noordraven, Bullettino dl Diritto Romano
83 (1980) 247 ff.
6
 D. 50,16,238,2 (Gaius).
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D.13,7,9,2 (Ulpianus): 'Pignus' is properly used when possession has been deliv-
ered to the creditor and 'hypotheca', even if possession is not transferred to the
creditor.7
A Roman pledge (pignus) differed radically from a modern European
'pledge'. Some of the problems encountered in modern European law
can only be understood if it is kept in mind that this difference can be
traced to the origin and development of the Roman concept of pignus.
Pignus was created by traditio, which is by surrender of civilis possessio to
the chargee. The latter did not become a mere bailee (detentor), as hè is
in modern Continental European civil law, but a possessor, the pledgor
not even retaining constructive possession. A subsequent surrender of
possession by the pledgee to the pledgor, however, did not terminate
his security interest, as is the case in modern Continental European
Systems. Consequently, the object of a possessory security interest was
not infrequently leased to the chargor:8
D. 13,7,35,1 (Florentinus): 'Pignus' merely confers possession on the creditor,
because it remains the property of the debtor: the debtor, however, is allowed
to use his own property at the will of the pledgee or as a lessee.9
D. 13,7,37 (Paulus): Whenever I have leased a pledge delivered to me to the owner,
I retain possession by the lease, because before the debtor took the lease, it was
not his possession, all the more so because I have the will to retain possession
and a lessee cannot have the will to obtain possession.10
Whenever property had been charged by way of pledge and was sub-
sequeritly bailed (transferred) to the chargor, there was practically no
difference between pignus and hypotheca. This is the apparent reason for
the observation by the Roman lawyer Marcianus that 'the difference
between pignus and hypotheca is purely verbal'.11 The phenomenon also
helps to explain why Roman sources use the concept of pignus in a rather
cavalier way: sometimes it stands for a special security interest, created
7
 'Proprie pignus dicimus, quod ad creditorem transit, hypothecam, cum non transit
nee possessio ad creditorem.'
8
 See Tondo, Labeo 5 (1959) 157 ff.; and Käser, Studio et Documenta Historiae et luris 45
(1979) l ff.
9
 'Pignus manente proprietate debitoris solam possessionem transfert ad creditorem:
polest tarnen et precario et pro conducto debitor re sua uti.'
10
 'Si pignus mihi traditum locassem domino, per locationem retineo possessionem,
quia antequam conduceret debitor, non fuerit eius possessio, cum et animus mihi
retinendi sit et conducenti non sit animus possessionem apiscendi.'
II
 D. 20,1,5,1 (Marcianus): 'Inter pignus autem et hypothecam tantum nominis sonus
differt.'
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by surrender of possession, sometimes it is synonymous with the concept
of 'security interest' in general. On reflection, therefore, the antithesis
ofpignus and Tiypotheca in Roman law does not necessarily correspond to
the distinction between possessory and non-possessory security interests
of modern civil law Systems: a Roman 'pledge' might well have amounted
to a non-possessory security interest. It might even have been created by
constructive delivery (constitutum possessorium), so that the chargor never
lost factual possession of the objects securing his debt to the chargee.
The famous Roman lawyer Ulpian had already observed that creditors
frequently left their debtors in actual possession of property charged by
way of pledge (pignus).12
Roman law found itself in quite a predicament, due to the fact that
it was possible in all types of security interests to leave the objects of
security in the hands of the debtor. The total absence of any system of
Publicity created serious problems in practice, especially in so far as the
ranking of subsequent chargees of the same property was concerned.
Ranking has been dominated by a simple rule of thumb - prior tempore,
potior iure13 - for most of the history of Roman law. A refinement was
introduced only relatively late. In AD 472 the emperor Leo decreed that
a security interest, created by 'public instrument', or a written memo-
randum signed by three witnesses, ranked higher than preceding secu-
rity interests not created in this way.14 It should be stressed that the
emperor did not invalidate security interests not created in conformity
with this provision. On the contrary: even after 472 all security inter-
ests, created in accordance with the ancient rules of the Roman common
law, were still valid, albeit that security interests created in accordance
with Leo's provision had priority over all security interests not comply-
ing with his formalities. The significance of the emperor's innovation
was that hè introduced an additional rule of preference, thus confusing
matters even more. After 472 third parties, having acquired title to goods
charged by a former owner, continued to be confronted by chargees till
then unknown to them with actions for recovery of the property for the
execution of a predecessor's debts.
Another factor that considerably complicated the Roman system of
security interests was that they could be vested not only in individual
parts of the debtor's estate, but in his entire estate as such.15 The former
D. 43,26,6,4 (Ulpianus): 'cottidie enim precario rogantur creditores ab his, qui pignori
dederunt'. See also D. 43,26,11 (Celsus).
13
 C. 8,17 (18),3. See also VI0, De regulis iuris, reg. 54. M C. 8,17,11,1.
15
 D. 20,1,1 pr. (Papinianus).
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were designated as 'special' secuiïty interests and the latter as 'general'
security interests. There were no fundamental differences between
'general' and 'special' security interests, their relationship being deter-
mined by the same ancient rules of preference and by Leo's decree of 472.
Consequently it frequently occurred that older general security interests
had priority over later special security interests, even if the latter had
been created by transfer of possession of the object of security to the
chargee.15
I will confine this chapter to consensual security interests, namely
those created by virtue of an agreement. It should be noted, however,
that there were many 'special' as well as 'general' statutory security
interests in Roman law. They must be distinguished from mere privi-
leges, because the latter are only concerned with priority (preference),
whereas the former were a genuine charge on the property of the
debtor. Of course, some of these statutory security interests were indeed
'privileged', in that they had priority (preference) over older consensual
security interests.
Even disregarding the confusing complexity of 'general' and 'special'
pertaining to consensual as well as statutory security interests, the
Roman system of security interests had one main deficiency: the absence
of an adequate system of publicity, especially in so far as movables were
concerned. Without publicity, Roman law could only maintain its sys-
tem of security interests by calling in the assistance of criminal law by
rendering it a crime to transfer property without disclosing to the trans-
feree the charges with which the property was burdened (stelltonatus).17
3. Later developments in the European ius commune
At the end of the fifteenth Century, the Roman system of security inter-
ests had become part of the law of practically all European countries,
with the exception of England and Wales. This system drew sharp crit-
icism from the famous Dutch lawyer Johannes Voet (1647-1713), whose
Commentarius ad Pandertas was regarded as an authoritative restatement
of the European ius commune all over the European continent and in
Scotland up to the nineteenth century. He characterised the system as 'a
labyrinth of creditors, where lawyers creep around on winding and tortu-
ous tracks'.18 The deficiencies of the system were, however, not addressed
16
 D. 20,4,2 and 20,5,1 (Papinianus). 17 D. 47,20,3,1 (Ulpianus).
18
 Commentarius ad Pandectas, ed. Geneva 1757, Lib. 20, tit. 4, no 17.
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by the introduction of an adequate system of publicity and registration,
but by gradually eliminating some, if not all, of the consequences of the
Roman non-possessory security interest of hypotheca, at least in so far as
movables were concerned.
In order to avoid misconceptions, it should be emphasized that the
phenomenon known as the 'reception' of Roman law on the European
continent and in Scotland did not bring about a European 'common
law'. Apart from regional and national differences in customary and
statutory law, Roman law only had the status of a subsidiary and never
as an exclusive source of law on any subject. Consequently, there were
considerable variations in the extent to which the Roman system of
security interests had been incorporated into the law of most European
countries. This chapter has been written on the basis of 'Roman-Dutch'
law, not because it still obtains in the Republic of South Africa, but
because it was widely considered an outstanding example of the 'modern
application' (usus modernus) of Roman law. This changed only after the
fame of the Dutch authors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
was eclipsed by the celebrated German 'Pandectists' of the nineteenth
Century. By that time, however, the traditional system had practically
ceased to exist everywhere else on the European continent.
In Holland, as in some other European countries, the relationship
between 'general' and 'special' security interests was placed on a differ-
ent footing to Roman law. 'Special' security interests were granted pref-
erence over 'general' security interests.19 This was the first step in the
development of the modern continental 'specificity principle' that only
allows security interests in specific assets of the debtor and abolishes
(at least in theory) the old Roman 'general' security interests. Another
new development was that in some, but certainly not all, European 'civil
law'jurisdictions all hypothecs, 'general' as well as 'special', were made
subject to the ancient customary maxim mobilia non habent sequelam,
'meubles n'ont pas de suite' ('movables cannot be traced into the hands
of third parties').20 Whenever personal property subject to a hypothec
19
 The so-called 'Political Ordonance' of 1580 is to be found in Groot Placaet Boek I, 329.
20
 It has already been emphasised in the text that the 'reception' of Roman law did not
provide the European continent and Scotland with uniformity of (private) law: the
differences between the various regions and countries could be substantial. This
applies especially to the question whether or not the rule mobilia non habent sequelam
had been adopted in a particular region. In the Saxon territories of the German
empire it did not apply to (special or general) non-possessory security interests. The
only exception concerned a floating charge on the stock-in-trade of a shop: see
Carpzov, Jurisprudentia forensis Romano-Saxonicus, Pars II, const. 23, definitie 12 and 13.
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was transferred to a third party, that security interest expired.21 Con-
sequently, hypothecs on movables could only be enforced as long as
the chargor was still in possession. The question now was whether this
also applied to a non-possessory pledge where the pledgee was not in
possession, either because the security interest had been created by con-
structive delivery (constitutum possessorium), or because the pledgee had
restored actual possession to the pledgor as nis bailee.
Voet held that all non-possessory security interests, be they a hypothec
or a non-possessory pledge, were subject to the maxim mobilia non nabent
sequelam.22 He went even further by suggesting that security interests in
movables could only be validly created by transfer of possession to the
creditor, thus virtually eliminating the Roman hypothec on movables.23
His opinion was explicitly rejected by the 'High Council' of Holland,
the highest court of judicature in Holland at the time, in an important
decision of 13 November 1737.24 The case concerned a shopkeeper, who
had transferred her stock-in-trade to a creditor by way of constructive
delivery, obviously in order to avoid the rules applying to hypothecs.
The court feit obliged to determine the true nature of the transaction
by considering the actual words used by the parties. It found that the
parties actually intended to create a security interest by way of construc-
tive delivery. What had actually happened, therefore, was that, despite
Voet's contrary opinion, a valid pledge on the stock had been created
by constructive delivery. The 'High Council' adhered to this precedent
throughout its existence.25 Consequently, shortly before the introduc-
tion of the first Dutch Civil Code (in 1809), the law of Holland recog-
nised no less than four kinds of security interests in movables: pos-
sessory pledge (pignus, with the pledgee retaining possession), a hybrid
'non-possessory' kind of pledge, hypothec and, of course, the general
hypothec on all the movable assets of the debtor.
21
 Grotius, Inleiding« II, 48, 29. See Pothier, Traite de l'Hypothèque, Ch. premier, sect. II, § l
(Oeuvres de Pothier VII, Paris 1818, 315) on similar rules m Normandy and some other
French temtones,
22
 Commentarius ad Pandectas 20,1,12.
23
 Ibtd: 'ipsi rei mobilis possessioni mcumbere debere creditorem'. See also van der
Linden, Regtsgeleerd Practicaaï en Koopmans Handboek 1,12,3.
24
 Van Bynkershoek, Observaüones tumultuariae IV, no 3051.
25
 See Pauw, Observationes tumultuariae novae l no 187 (23 Sep. 1746). It should be stressed
that contemporary legal practitioners were largely unaware of the opmions of the
court, because at that time judicial decisions were given without any\reasomng. The
reports of Bynkershoek and Pauw were not pubhshed until the twentieth Century. This
cunous phenomenon helps to explain why the opinion of Voet remamed mfluential,
despite the fact that, as we now know, it was explicitly rejected by the 'High Council'
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The Situation in Scotland was (and is) less complicated. The Roman
hypothec on movables has never been incorporated into Scottish law.26
Due to the close relationship between Roman-Dutch law and Scottish
law,27 the authority of Voet was sufficient to secure the rejection of
pledges created by way of constructive delivery (constitutum possessorium)
and the introduction of the rule that a pledge is destroyed whenever
possession is restored to the pledgor.28 It hardly needs emphasis that the
law of Holland, or that of any other country with similar legal rules, did
not accept the concept of a fiduciary transfer of title to movables by way
of constructive delivery for the purpose of creating what is essentially a
security interest in the movables thus transferred.
The opinion of Voet that transfer of possession was necessary for the
creation of a charge prevailed in Scotland and in the 'Roman-Dutch'
law of the Republic of South Africa. Attempts to by-pass this strict rule
included fiduciary transfer by way of constructive delivery and a sale
and lease-back transaction. Both mechanisms failed in Scotland, when-
ever possession was not transferred de facto, i.e. whenever transfer of
title was effected by way of a traditio ficta. Similar attempts have also
been frustrated in South Africa.29 New possibilities occurred in Scotland
after the introduction of the Sale of Goods Act in 1893. In contracts of
sale of goods, the Act abolished the ancient Roman rule that title in the
goods can only be transferred by traditio and introduced the common
law rule that title passes on conclusion of the contract of sale.30 The
new System of transfer of title seemed to open an opportunity to ere
ate security interests in movables without transfer of possession to the
chargee by way of sale and lease-back transactions. These attempts have
also failed.31
26
 Dalrymple of Stair, Institutions of the Law of Scotland, ed. Walker IV,25,1 and Bell,
Commentaries on the Law of Scotland II 25: 'in this country, conventional hypothecs
on movables have no force even against personal creditors'. For similar rules in
the 'Coütumes de Paris' and those of Orleans see Pothier, Traite de l'Hypothèque,
Ch. premier, sect. II, § l (Oeuvres de Pothier VII, 315).
27
 See Stewart v LMS (1943) Ses. Cas. (House of Lords) 19, at pp. 38-39 per Lord MacMillan.
28
 See North Western Bank v Poynter (1894) 21 Rettie 513, at 525 and Beli's Commentaries on
the Law of Scotland II 22. The decision of the Court of Session was reversed on appeal by
the House of Lords (North Western Bank v Poynter [1895] AC 56), bringing the law of
Scotland in line with the common law of England, which adheres less strictly to the
dispossession of the pledgor (see Reeves v Gapper (1838) Bing (NC) 136; 132 ER 1057).
29
 See Vasco Dry Cleaners v Twycross (1979) l SA 603 A and van der Merwe, Sakereg 688 ff.
30
 C. 2,3,20 and Lord Blackburn's dicta in M'Bain v Wattace 6 Co. (1881) 8 Rettie 106 (House
of Lords) 111 f.
31
 See the cases cited in Walker, Principles ofScoltish Private Law II 1582 (7).
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4. Security interests in movables in the continental
European codes
The French Code civil (1804) concluded the process of the demise of the
Roman hypothec on movables in France by requiring transfer of posses-
sion for the creation of a security interest in movables ('nantissement')32
and by limiting hypothec to real property (immovables).33 The creation
of pledge ('gage'), by way of constructive delivery, as well as the possi-
bility of allowing the pledgor to hold the movable property on behalf
of the pledgee (bailment), were effectively eliminated by article 2076
Cc: 'Dans tous les cas, Ie privilege ne subsiste sur Ie gage qu'autant
que ce gage a été mis et est resté en la possession du créancier, ou d'un
tiers convenu entre les parties' (italics added). The old Dutch Civil Code
(1838),34 the old Italian Civil Code (1865),35 the Spanish Civil Code36 and
even the German Civil Code of 190037contained similar provisions. The
German Bankruptcy Act ('Reichskonkursordnung') of 1877 already pro-
vided38 that security interests in movables that had not been created by
a permanent transfer of possession to the chargee created no preference,
thus finally abolishing the ancient Roman hypothec in movables ('Mobil-
iarhypothek') in Germany as well.39 I will leave an analysis of the way
in which modern continental European law has been able to cope with
these provisions to others and confine myself to general observations
on security interests in movables on the European continent during the
nineteenth Century.
From a modern perspective, it seems stränge that the abolition of non-
possessory security interests in movables in continental European codes
did not meet with strenger resistance from banks and at least a consider-
able portion of the business community. The statutory provisions forced
32
 Articles 2017-2072 Cc. It is usually emphasised in French textbooks (sce e.g. Ripert
and Boulanger, Traite de Droit civil III, Paris 1958, no 52 (19)) that the concepts of
'nantissement' and 'gage' originale from ancient French customary law, rather than
from Roman law. True as this may be, one cursory look in Pothier's Traite du Contrat de
Nantissement suffices to conclude that they were construed and applied on the basis of
the Roman concept of pignus. A 'nantissement' without 'tradition reelle' by the
pledgor to the pledgee was even construed as a Roman hypotheca: see Pothier, Traite de
l'Hypothèque, Ch. IV, article l, § 1.
33
 Article 2118 Cc. Later statutory provisions have extended 'hypothec' to aeroplanes and
ships above a certain tonnage.
34
 Article 1198 0(ud) BW (1838), repealed in 1992.
35
 Article 1882 Codice civik del Regno d'Italia (1865). 36 Article 1863 Código civil.
37
 §§ 1204, 1205 and 1253 BGB. 38 RKO § 14.
39
 On this development see Hromadka, Die Entwicklung des Faustpfandprinzips im 18. und 19.
Jahrhundert.
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the pledge-debtor to part with possession of his movable assets, thus ren-
dering them unproductive, a consequence that may not even have been
in the interest of his creditor. The pledge-creditor, on the other hand,
was forced to store and maintain goods at a high cost without even being
allowed to use the goods himself. In my Submission this extraordinarily
impractical and ill-considered statutory arrangement can be explained
by the following observations.
First, the banking world of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries was, in my opinion, not structured to provide business cap-
ital to the industrial community on the basis of security interests in
the stock-in-trade and machinery of its clients. Although the banks did
indeed finance trade on a large scale, this was more often than not done
on the basis of personal security (guarantees), rather than on the basis
of security of a proprietary nature. An entrepreneur in need of credit
to expand his industrial activities was usually dependent on sources
other than banks. Hence the proliferation of limited partnerships in
the nineteenth Century. Presumably banks only explored forms of secu-
rity other than guarantees after the advent of modern business cor-
porations. This structural change in the financing of industrial activ-
ities by banks may well have originated in the oversupply of money
on the German market as a result of the reparations made by France
after the war of 1870-1871. Was this the economie origin of the German
' Sicherheitsübereignung'?
Secondly, the business community was not severely hampered by the
provisions of the new codes. Long before'their introduction, the stan-
dard procedure in Amsterdam and other important ports was to transfer
property stored in warehouses by transfer of the warrants (bills of lad-
ing)40 and to charge such goods by pledging the warrants to a creditor.41
These practices were even sanctioned in certain codes, for example in
the Dutch Code of 1838.42 It is not surprising that this commercial prac-
tice inspired the first French mechanisms to introducé non-possessory
security interests in movables after the introduction of the Code
civü.
40
 See the eighteenth-century cases reported in Pauw, Observationes lumultuariae novae I,
nos 490, 556 and H, no 627.
41
 Ibid., III, no 1490 (a case from 1779).
42
 Article 670 of the Dutch Civil Code of 1838; the Provision was repealed in 1934. Of
particular interest is van der Lelij, levering van roerende zaken door middel van een
zakenrechtelijlc waardepapier 3-15.
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5. Common law and civil law
English common law also recognises two security interests in goods,
one being possessory, namely pledge or pawn, the other being non-
possessory, namely the chattel mortgage. The Suggestion has even been
made that these two common law security interests corresponded to
the Roman security interests: pledge being essentially the Roman pignus,
the nature of the (chattel) mortgage being basically the same as that
of the Roman hypotheca. This equation, however, was explicitly rejected
in the famous case of Ryall v Rolle (1749).43 Burnet J observed correctly
that, according to Roman law, delivery of possession was only required
for the establishment of a security interest in the case of pledges, as it
was - and is - according to common law. However, the learned judge
expressly and unequivocally rejected the Suggestion that the common
law (chattel) mortgage can be identified with the Roman hypothec.
An hypotheca gave only a lien and no property with a right to be satisfied on
failure of the condition and a mortgage with us is an immediate conveyance
with a power to redeem and gives a legal property.
It is quite remarkable that Burnet J tried to define a common law mort-
gage by reference to a text in the Corpus luris, to wit C.4,54,2:
If your parents have sold land on condition that it be restored if either they
themselves or their heirs have at some time or within a certain period offered
to repay the price and the heir of the purchaser is not inclined to keep his part
of that agreement, whereas you are prepared to satisfy him, a (personal) action
on the basis of that agreement will be given to you.44
The Judge remarked that this was the description of an English mort-
gage in Roman law and also referred to C.4,54,7.45 These observations
provide us with an excellent description of the common law mortgage
43
 l Atk. 165; l Wils. 260; 1 Ves.Sen. 348; 9 Bli.N. S. 377; 26 ER 107; [1558-1774] All ER 82.
44
 'Si fundum parentes tui ea lege vendiderunt, ut, sive ipsi sive heredes eorum emptori
pretium quandoque vel intra certa tempora obtulissent, restitueretur, teque parato
satisfacere condicioni dictae heres emptoris non paret, ut contractus fides servetur,
actio praescriptis verbis vel ex vendito tibi dabitur.'
45
 'If the person you have mentioned has bought from you on condition that the thing
sold ought to be restituted if a certain amount has been paid within a certain period,
you cannot bring an action under our "rescript" that the agreement be annulled. But
if hè tries to back out of his Obligation by retaining that thing on account of his
ownership, you can secure your interest by the remedies of signification, deposition
and Sequestration (i.e. of the money to be paid).' ('Si a te comparavit is cuius
meministi et convenit, ut, si intra certum tempus soluta fuerit data quantitas, sit res
inempta, remitti hanc conventionem rescripto nostro non iure petis. Sed si se
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in terms of Roman law. The texts used by Burnet J have been taken
from section 54 of the fourth book of Justinian's Code, inscribed De
pactis inter emptorem et venditorem compositis ('On the conditions agreed
upon between buyer and seller'). The common law mortgage is thus
construed as a conditional sale, vesting the general proprietary interest
in land or chattels thus mortgaged in the mortgagee. These provisions
from Justinian's Code played a crucial role in the development of a new
kind of non-possessory security interest in movables in Europe during
the nineteenth Century.
Most continental European codes, like the French Code civil,46 the
Dutch Civil Code of 1838,47 and even the German Code of 1900,48 con-
tain provisions derived from this passage in Justinian's Code. These provi-
sions, known as 'faculté de rachat' or 'vente ä réméré' in France, concern
the stipulation by a seller to redeem his property on tender of the price.
Roman law also provided for this kind of contract, not, of course, as
an alternative to security interests for which there was no need, but
to regulate an Option granted to a seller to redeem his property. One
possibility was that his Option merely conferred a right in personam, not
a right in re. After the introduction of the strict rules on the creation
of a pledge in the European codes and the elimination of the Roman
hypothec on chattels, these statutory provisions on the right of redemp-
tion were relied upon to by-pass the strict statutory provisions on the
creation of security interests in movables. Such attempts met with vary-
ing degrees of success in Europe, thus causing a genuine divide between
the European legal Systems. In most jurisdictions, for example in France,
these attempts have totally failed. The courts looked beyond the form of
these transactions and often found that an apparently valid form con-
cealed an essentially illegal substance.49 Germany and the Netherlands,
however, followed a substantially different approach.
First the German Bankruptcy Act practically abolished the old hypo-
thec on movables by restricting preference (priority) over the general
subtrahat, ut iure dominii eandem rem retineat, denuntiationis et obsignationis
depositionisque remedio contra fraudem potes iure tuo consulere.')
46
 Articles 1659 ff. Cc.
47
 Articles 1555 ff. Dutch Civil Code of 1838; the provisions were repealed in 1992.
48
 §§ 497 ff. BGB.
49
 See, for example, the important decision in Loewenstein, Polak 6 Co. C. Decaux, Req. 11
Mar. 1879, D. 79.1.401. The Cour de cassaiion ruled (Req. 21 Mar. 1938, D.H. 1938.2.57)
that the decision whether a particular contract is a valid 'vente ä réme'ré' or an illegal
security interest is a matter to be decided on the merits of the circumstances of each
individual case by the courts taking notice of the facts.
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creditors in bankruptcy to pledges created by transfer of possession to
the pledgee. Only three years later, the new German Reichsgericht was
confronted with two cases concerning an attempt to create a security
interest in movables by means of sale and lease-back transactions. In
one decision, the third civil division of the court decided that this
transaction created a security interest in substance under the guise
of a contract for the sale of goods with powers of redemption of the
seller. It ruled that the contract was void.50 In the other decision, how-
ever, the first civil division of the court held that such a contract was
acceptable if it had been the genuine intention of the seller to trans-
fer the true title to his creditor with a stipulation for redemption. The
court regarded the fact that the economie purpose of the contract was
to create a security interest as immaterial.51 As long as the form and
appearance of a genuine sale and lease-back was retained, a security
interest could be created on the basis of a contract of sale and lease-
back. The sale was naturally executed by constructive delivery, leaving
the seller in possession and converting his powers of redemption into
a legal or economie duty to redeem. Ten years later, the 'Reichsgericht'
explicitly recognised that the causa for the constructive transfer of mov-
able property could be the creation of a security interest in that prop-
erty.52 Tlius, after a considerable lapse of time, flauem was finally rein-
troduced in a civil law system. The Dutch 'High Council' followed suit in
1929.53
About the same time as continental European lawyers were in the
process of reinventing the ancient Roman fiducia cum creditore by trans-
forming Justinian's provisions on conveyance of property with a stipu-
lation for redemption to supersede the strict Roman provisions on con-
veyance, the character of a chattel mortgage - essentially a conveyance
50
 RG 24 Sep 1880, RGZ 2, 173 As the case had to be decided accordmg to Roman law,
the court based lts decision on D 18,1,80,3 (Labeo) and C 4,22,3
51
 RG 9 Oct 1880, RGZ 2, 168 (170) 'Es ist nicht nur rechtlich zulassig, sondern auch
in häufiger Übung, daß einem Glaubiger zu seiner Sicherstellung wegen einer
persönlicher Fordeiung von seinem Schuldner ein Vermogens-Objekt m der durchaus
einsthchen Absicht veikauft und übertragen wird, daß der Glaubiger als Kaufer
wukhcher Eigentumer und zur Ausübung aller Rechte eines Eigentumers befugt
weiden soll, der wntschaftliche Zweck einer bloßen Sicherstellung aber dadurch
erreicht wnd, daß der Glaubiger sich durch Nebenabreden persönlich verbindlich
macht, unter gewissen vereinbarten Bedingungen das Eigentum dem bisherigen
Schuldner zuruckzuubertragen ' It is a cunous but totally accidental comcidence that
the formulation of this decision practically matches the important recent decision of
the Dutch 'High Council', In re Sogelease (19 May 1995 (NJ 1996, 119)), almost verbatim
52
 RG 2 June 1890, RGZ 26, 180 53 Hoge Raad 25 Jan 1929 (NJ 1929, 616)
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of property with a stipulation for redemption54 - was fundamentally
changed in England. The legislative act which triggered this change was
the introduction of Bills of Sale Acts (since 1878) and the requirement
of registration. After then, 'chattel mortgages' were only allowed if the
grantor had actually transferred possession to the grantee. Only then
did the mortgagee enjoy preference over the general creditors upon his
debtor's bankruptcy. Creditors have naturally tried to by-pass these provi-
sions by returning to the archetype of non-possessory security in chattels
of the common law, the conditional sale (the sale and lease-back or a
hire-purchase contract). Insufficient attention has been paid on the con-
tinent, especially in the Netherlands, to the way in which English courts
enforce the Sale of Goods Act. 'The court is to look through and behind
the documents, and to get at the reality.'55 More often than not, the
court finds a sham or simulated security transaction behind an appar-
ently valid transaction and refuses to allow a creditor to avail himself
of a proprietary security interest created in this way.56
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